This paper is based upon the premise that if we assume a relation between democracy and pubhc space-as many architects and critics do then, it follows, that we actively need to investigate the possibilities for understanding the relations between particular concepts of democracy and particular spatial practices. In this paper, I propose the value of using the texts of public sphere theorists, who investigate the conditions of discourse necessary for advancing the common good, as a lens for interrogating spatial practices.
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Architects, architectural critics, and public sphere theorists share an overlapping verbal language. Public sphere theorists often speak metaphorically of "sites," "theaters," and "arenas" of citizen interaction while architects gloss their work with claims of democratic values without actually specifying the conception of democracy that they wish their work to advance. Although there is a problem in transferring the tenn "public" from one discussion to another, the relations spun by language perversely invite the translation of what might be inerely an analogy into a methodology where the one acts as the lens and the other as the object of analysis.
The need for inore precision in our discussions about democracy and its relation to public space was exemplified by a provocative symposium, "From Public to Social Space(s)," that took place at the Harvard School of Design in 1994.' On the one hand, the value of public space in democratic societies was taken as a given. On the other, the architects and designers who participated were reluctant to address how design might play a role in advancing specific types of social interaction that might serve particular democratic interests. The discussion, in fact, suggested a reluctance on the part of the architects and designers to claim an active role for design, which rendered moot the need for them to specify the type of democracy they believed that particular fomis of public spaces might advance. Taken to its logical conclusions, the symposium suggested either that design has no role to play in fijrthering democracy, or that it is not possible to develop productive discourse about the role of design, given that architecture effects, and is effected by, socially and culturally diverse individuals. Circulation System. about imaginary others among readers of novels, whose perceptions challenge and supplement one another, advances the process of public reasoning about human dignity that is essential to democracy. Might not discussion about the relation between particular architectural strategies and particular concepts of democracy also advance public reasoning to the benefit of both architecture and democracy?
In this paper I am going to turn the lens of Nancy Eraser's socialist feminist revision of Jiirgen Habemias's theory of the public sphere on the work of the Iraqi emigre architect Zaha Hadid. 1 have selected Hadid in part because discussions of her work usually focus on its formal radicality without interrogation of its political potential. Yet in interviews and writings, Hadid has indicated that she sees an active social role for architecture. "I think architecture can invent culture," she has said. Describing her education at the Architectural Association in London, she stated, "it was not about pursuit of our own egos. It was about . . . making a new architecture . . . creating a new world."' She speaks of using architecture to make a "site pub- influence the actions of government for the public good. Habermas extrapolated the concept of the public sphere from the historical phenome-n on of "the 'civil society' of clubs and associations of the eighteenth-centug ty Enlightenment." He further construed the public sphere, if not the actual g clubs and associations, as providing particular conditions of discourse: "Thed iscussion was to be open and accessible to all ... power was to be excluded; and discussants were to deliberate as peers." In a word, "inequalities of status were to be bracketed. "* Although Habermas himself thinks that the political and economic conditions of late capitalism are not favorable to the sort of public sphere that he had defined, Nancy Fraser argues that "something like Habermas's idea of the public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory and to democratic practice."'' However, in the essays collected in Justice Interruptus, Fraser makes the case that political democracy cannot be fully achieved unless there is social and cultural equality in addition to formal equality before the law. It is from this perspective that she critiques and revises Habermas's theory of the public sphere.
In her revision of Habermas, Fraser argues that in practice inequalities of wealth and status can not be bracketed but substantively affect the course of public discussion validating some voices and not others. She therefore views his ideal of bracketing as inadvertently perpetuating a liberal agenda of trying to insulate political processes from socioeconomic and socio-sexual institutions that are premised on systemic relations of inequality.
Further, she objects to Habermas's concept of the public sphere as singular.
Instead, she argues for valuing "counter publics" which she defines, significantly, I think, for my purposes, as "spaces of withdrawal and regroupment. . . . bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics,"'" Fraser stresses that the combative and changing relations between counter publics and wider publics differ from the stable identity groups associated with the liberal politics of multiculturalism. Related to Eraser's distrust of a single public sphere is her distrust of an uncontested notion of the "common good." In Habermas's concept, self-interests and group interests were to be left at the door of the public sphere so there could be reasoned discussion about the common good. But in Eraser's words, "the postulation of a common good shared by exploiters and exploited may well be a mystification. Computer Generated Photomontage.
Habermas's construct of the "common good" also assumes a consensus about what constitutes public issues and private issues. Only public issues were to be brought into the reasoned discussions that constituted the public sphere. Fraser, not surprisingly, argues that ruling private concerns out of order keeps certain crucial issues off the table. For example, she states that "if questions of workplace democracy are labeled 'economic' or 'managerial" problems [and thus not for discussion in the public sphere] ... then this serves to perpetuate class (and usually also gender and race) dominance and subordination."'-Yet she insists also that: "For members of subordinate groups, it will always be a matter of balancing the potential political use of publicity against the dangers of loss of privacy."'-T hus, on multiple critical points, Fraser insists on the permeability of the boundaries between the activities of public reason and the actual social and cultural relations of participants. I would argue that it is precisely such permeability of boundaries that inost characterizes the work of Zaha readings ings, they call into question liberal architectural conventions that create the illusion of public spaces untainted by private ownership. Viewed through Eraser's lens, Hadid's architecUire might be said to invite a discourse about design and democracy that queries liberal assumptions about the possibility of bracketing the private from the public and, by extension, to expose the mystifications created by architectural design that creates an illusion of public spaces untainted by the social and cultural inequities of iree market capitalism.
Hadid deploys ambiguous transparencies not only to forestall easy conceptions of public space, but also to compromise psycho-cultural norms of privacy at the immediate scale of the embodied individual. At Vitra, for example, the warped axes create twisting channels of sight and movement along a locker wall giving fragmentary views of the translucent, glass toilet stalls provided for the men and women workers who rotated as volunteer firefighters at the Vitra furniture factory. One critic objected that this spatial construct "unnecessarily compromis[ed] privacy, amounting to ... 'a sneering at bourgeois sensibilities.'"'"' From the perspective of Eraser's concerns, however, this challenge to conventions of bodily privacy, enmeshed as it is in larger radicalities of space, both invites discussion about the conventions of gender in delineating public and private and generates a counter alternative to those norms.
At Cardiff and Cincinnati, Hadid more radically challenges conceptions associated with quotidian work. In the Cardiff Opera House project, rehearsal rooms are not tucked away but, with the various auditorium spaces, actively shape and displace the building edge. Bringing the rehearsal spaces to the surface of the warping translucent wall of the cortile asserts the daily labor of the perfonners within the public realm, destabilizing the boundaries between the spectacle of operatic perfonnance and the behindthe-scenes work of production. Likewise at the Cincinnati Arts Center, Hadid is taking advantage of the larger spatial ambiguities of the building to position the galleries and the staff offices so as to achieve, as she said, "an important type of blurring ... a more direct participation between . . . staff and the visitors in the galleries."'-''
Here, as at Cardiff, architecture challenges those architectural nomis that, tracking the social and cultural conventions of a consumer society, render the labor of production invisible. In the context of Eraser's radical democratic theory, these spatial strategies might invite discussion about the value of perceiving such civic institutions as opera houses and museums as places of leisured pleasure. More precisely, through the lens of Eraser's recognition that the public realm cannot be bracketed from social and cultural conditions, this architecture may be seen to disturb the liberal illusion of an artistic realm bracketed fi'om the economy. 73, 1995) .
The purpose of this paper has been to associate architecture with that activity of reasoned discussion among private citizens for the public good, which is called the public sphere. In doing so, I have taken for granted that architecture is a producer of culture and may thereby act upon our understandings of ourselves and our society. Nancy Fraser's revision of Habermas's theory of the public sphere is intended to advance a more radical democracy grounded in reasoned discourse, by using, in her words, "critical theory ... to render visible the way in which societal and [cultural] inequality infects formally inclusive existing public spheres and taints discursive interaction within them."'* Today, most of us have awakened from the modernist dream that avant-garde art and architecture might, of themselves, change the world. That is not to say, however, that we have all given up the idea that radical spatial practices, acting on socially and culturally located individuals, may have a particular role to play in affecting discourses engaged with furthering a democracy grounded in social and cultural equality. am Rhein, Germany, 1991 -1993 Exterior (reprinted from El Croquis no. 73, 1995) .
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